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Abstract 
With more power, a manager can make more decisions or more important ones, and in this way 
have more impact on his firm. As a consequence, firm performance provides more information 
about the abilities of more powerful managers, who are more "visible". In this paper I analyze how 
the allocation of power in the firm affects the managers' career concerns when no manager's power 
can be increased without reducing another manager's. I show that, with a simple linear technology 
and risk-neutral managers, it is generally optimal to divide power in an unequal way, even though 
this may create conflicts of interest between managers. I also analyze how optimal pay-for-
performance schemes should depend on the allocation of power. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The allocation of power in a firm determines how individuals affect the decisions of the 
organization as a whole: powerful managers are entitled to make important decisions -
decisions which can potentially have a large impact on firm performance, such as approving 
large investment projects or designing new products and processes- while less powerful 
managers are left with fewer or less important decisions. Several papers in the incomplete 
contracting literature have recently pointed out that the allocation of power determines the 
employees' incentives to invest in specific human capital (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart 
and Moore, 1990) and to show initiative (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). In this paper I study 
the costs and benefits of different allocations of power from a different perspective: suppose 
a firm employs several managers, some more powerful than others, and suppose that the 
labor market tries to assess their abilities by looking at their firm's performance. If firm 
performance is poor, it would be irrational for the market to blame the powerless managers 
more than the powerful ones. And if performance is good a rational market would have 
to give more credit to the powerful ones. As a consequence powerful managers, realizing 
that they are more accountable, would have an incentive to work harder and build a good 
reputation, while less powerful managers would have less incentives to do so. 
Combining Holmstrom (1982a) and Holmstrom (1982b), I use a model of team production 
with career concerns to analyze the costs and benefits of different allocations ~f power. In this 
model, managers are endowed with general human capital whose value cannot be perfectly 
evaluated by their current employer or by the labor market, and have an incentive to work 
hard because this increases the market's estimate of their human capital. Their employer 
divides power among them in order to maximize profits, taking into account that power makes 
managers more visible to the market, and that more visible managers work harder. As in Hart 
and Moore (1990) or Aghion and Tirole (1997) I also assume that there is a limited amount 
of power in the firm, that managers have to share. As a consequence, when the firm increases 
a manager's power it has to trade off the increase in this manager's incentives against the 
reduction in the other manager's. However, in contrast with the previous literature I point 
out that this trade-off is endogenously determined by labor market competition: the benefits 
managers get from power depend on how the market uses firm performance to re-estimate 
the value of their individual human capital. Thus, while other authors have emphasized 
that power motivates managers because it allows them to make decisions which benefit them 
personally and may not benefit the firm, I take the view that power motivates managers 
because it makes them more visible to the market. I stress that precisely because powerful 
managers have more opportunities to make inefficient decisions, a rational market will, in 
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equilibrium, consider them more accountable for their firm's performance. Hence these 
managers will behave more efficiently than their less powerful colleagues. 
I begin by assuming that the only instrument the firm can use to motivate managers 
is power, and I analyze the determinants of the optimal allocation of power in that case. 
I show that in general it is optimal to divide power in an unequal way. This challenges 
the view often found in the literature on employee participation that one of the benefits of 
distributing power equally is that employees become more motivated: instead, I find that 
when the allocation of power is made more equal the reduction in one of the manager's 
incentives generally offsets the increase in the other manager's. This is due to two reasons. 
Firstly, power and managerial effort are complements: if a manager decides to work harder, 
it is profitable for the firm to give him more power, so that the organization as a whole 
benefits more from his effort; but having more power, the manager will realize he is more 
visible to the market and will work even harder, and it will be profitable to give him even 
more power. Secondly, I find that the market's learning process about the managers' human 
capital is convex with respect to power: as the firm increases a manager's power and reduces 
another manager's, the increase in the former's incentives more than offsets the reduction in 
the latter's. 
Within this framework, I also analyze the relationship between power and performance 
pay when pay-for-performance schemes can be made contingent on firm performance, but not 
on individual managerial performance. Using assumptions similar to Gibbons and Murphy 
(1992) I find three reasons why optimal pay-for-performance schemes should depend on 
the allocation of power between managers. First of all, the larger a manager's power, the 
cheaper it is for him to influence firm performance, and therefore the size of his bonus. Hence 
if the firm offered the same incentive rate to two managers at different positions, the one 
with more power would exert more effort. Secondly, because power generates incentives via 
labor market competition, it is not necessary to give high explicit incentives to powerful 
managers, because such managers realize how visible they are and tend to work hard even if 
they are offered low bonuses. 8inally, the distribution of power affects the variance of firm 
performance, which is minimized when all managers have equal power. If managers are risk-
averse, this affects the cost of using performance pay to increase managerial effort. Thus, 
when managerial career concerns are not important and managers are not very risk averse 
it is optimal for the firm to give higher performance bonuses to more powerful managers. 
3 
•. 
2 POWER AND LEARNING 
2.1 SET-UP 
I extend Holmstrom's (1982b) model of managerial career concerns in two directions. First 
of all, I assume that firms employ two managers instead of one, and that the labor market 
cannot observe their individual performance: only firm performance is observable. Hence, 
the firm faces a particular kind of team production problem where team members' payoffs 
are adjusted in time through labor market competition and incentives are generated by this 
dynamic adjustment process. In contrast, in the standard team production problem (see 
Homstrom, 1982a) the firm provides incentives by designing pay-for-performance contracts. 
The role of career concerns is particularly important at top levels of management since top 
managers' decisions easily affect company performance, which is observed by the market. In 
contrast, the performance of low-level units of a company is rarely observed by the market, 
and career concerns are relatively unimportant at that level. Hence in the model managers 
A and B are considered to be top managers and Yt is a measure of corporate performance 
observable by the labor market. By choosing how much power to give to each manager, the 
firm can make it easy or difficult for the market to learn about them. Thus, the importance 
of career concerns is endogenously determined in the model. In this sense this is also a 
peculiar team production problem, where power (as opposed to pay-for-performance) is used 
as an instrument to limit free riding. l 
Production. A risk-neutral firm (the principal) employs two managers, A and B (the 
agents), at periods t = 1,2 and maximizes the discounted sum of expected profits using 8 
as a discount rate. The firm's technology at period t has the following constant returns to 
scale form: 
(1) 
where Yt is output, eAt is manager A's effort, TJA is manager A's ability and TJB and eBt are 
similarly defined for manager B. Manager A's potential productivity is TJA + eAt, but once he 
is hired, his effective contribution to the firm depends on the amount of power he receives, 
characterized by r.p A. If he receives little power (low r.p A), anything he does has a smaller 
impact on output than it would have had, had he been given more power. Thus I define 
power as the degree to which a manager can affect his firm's performance: a manager may 
lIn two recent papers, Meyer (1994) and Jeon (1996) have used a similar model. However, their focus is 
on efficient task assignment in a context where there is no managerial effort, whereas I am interested in the 
relationship between power and incentives. 
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be very talented, but his company only benefits from it to the extent that he is allowed to 
make relatively important decisions. Otherwise his talent is wasted. 
For example, suppose two managers are in charge of launching a new product and have 
to decide how to use their budgets. Suppose each manager is in charge of a different aspect 
of the project, for example manufacturing and marketing. Assume also that the company 
can decide what budget is given to each manager, and let li (for i E {A, B}) denote manager 
i's budget. Suppose the new product generates returns measured by V, which depend on 
the two managers' choices, and let VA and VB (with VA + VB = V) denote the returns due 
to A and B respectively. Ideally, the firm would like to be able to decompose V into VA and 
VB, i.e. to know what part of the returns generated by the new product is attributable to 
the marketing and manufacturing decisions respectively. However, it is usually impossible 
to make this decomposition. With I = lA + IB' the rate of return of the project is 
and the company would like to infer separate rates of return {lA and {lB for each manager 
based on V, lA, and lB. In this example, we can define a manager's power as the relative 
size of his budget, 'Pi = Id I, and write 
The problem of the firm would then be to find the budget allocation that maximizes the 
expected rate of return of the new product. 
In the incomplete contracting literature it is usually considered that power is a limited 
resource in the firm (see for example Hart and Moore (1990) and Aghion and Tirole (1997)). 
In the same spirit, I make the following assumption: 
Assumption 1 'P A + 'P B = 1. 
As in Holmstrom's (1982b) original model, I assume that the abilities TJA and TJB are 
constants unknown to everyone (including the managers themselves), and that all players 
have identical prior beliefs with distribution TJi rv N(TJiO, a;) for i E {A, B} and COV(TJA, TJB) = 
O. Finally, the random variable et is a productivity shock to the firm, with et rv N(O, a;) for 
t = 1,2. Such shocks are assumed to be independently distributed. 
Labor Market Competition. A competitive labor market for managers observes the perfor-
mance of the firm (i. e. of the team of managers) and makes inferences about the managers' 
abilities. In equilibrium, a competitive labor market should offer higher wages to the man-
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agers that are thought to have a higher ability. Hence our second assumption: 
Assumption 2 When manager i is thought to have ability TJil his value to the labor market 
is ITJil with 0 < I < l. 
Thus, because of labor market competition, the market wage of a manager does not 
directly depend on his power: it only depends on his perceived ability. However, power does 
affect the manager's market wage in an indirect way, by making him more or less visible. 
Utility functions. Both managers have the same strictly increasing, convex disutility 
of effort c(e), and the same utility function. Their reservation utility is O. I also assume 
that they discount the future at the same rate, 8, as the principal. Finally, I consider a 
risk-neutral and a risk-averse case. In the risk neutral case, the utility function is 
2 
Urn(Wil, Wi2; eil, ei2) = L 8t - l [Wit - c(eit)] (2) 
t=l 
where Wit is the wage paid to manager i E {A, B} at period t. For the risk-averse case I use 
the following exponential utility function: 
(3) 
which implies that managers have access to a perfect capital market. In this way I abstract 
from the issue of how the principal can use the labor contracts to smooth the managers' 
incomes over time. 
Timing. There are only two periods, and decisions are made in the following order: 
• The market offers each manager i a wage wft' for period l. 
• The principal offers each manager i a position <Pi for both periods, and a wage Wil for 
period 1. 
• Managers accept or reject the principal's offers. 
• First-period production takes place: the managers choose eAl and eEl. 
• The productivity shock Cl is realized, and all players observe Yl. 
• The market offers each manager a second-period wage w~. 
• The principal offers each manager a second-period wage Wi2. 
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• Managers accept or reject the principal's offers. 
• Second-period production takes place. 
• The productivity shock C2 is realized, and all players observe Y2. 
I use the assumption that the firm commits to a certain allocation of power 'Pi in order 
to derive some basic results. After that, I relax the assumption and allow the firm to change 
the allocation of power once period-l performance has been observed and the beliefs about 
the managers have been updated. 
2.2 THE UPDATING PROCESS 
Let the equilibrium levels of managerial effort be denoted by eit (for i E {A, E} and t E 
{I, 2}). Because of normality, the posterior beliefs at period t about i's ability are a weighted 
average of today's signal and all past signals: 
t 
( ) "'( Zs 'P-i ) TJit = 1 - tait TJiO + ait ~ - - -TJ-iO . 




In the above expression I have used TJit to denote the posterior beliefs about manager i's 
ability after period-t performance has been observed. The coefficient ait measures the rate 
at which the principal updates his beliefs about manager i, or, in other words, the extent to 
which this manager is made accountable for firm performance: the higher ait, the more the 
principal blames this manager for a bad result or rewards him for a good one. Finally, Zt is 
the estimate of the team productivity that the players construct after observing period t's 
output, Yt. 
The characterization of the updating process provides us with the following relationship 
between power and accountability: 
Lemma 1 (Power and Accountability) 
• ail is increasing in 'Pi. 
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• There exists a critical value of power CPi such that the accountability parameter ail ex-
hibits increasing returns to power if <Pi < <Pi and decreasing returns to power otherwise. 
If (h < (Ji, then 0 < CPi < 1. 
Proof: Differentiating ail with respect to <Pi, we find {){)ai~ > 0 and {){)2a~1 > 0 or {){)2a~1 < 0 
'P, 'Pi 'Pi 
depending (respectively) on whether <Pi is low or high .• 
The first part of the lemma states that more powerful managers are more accountable 
than less powerful ones. Consider A's productivity in the firm at period 1, <PA(1]A + eAl). 
When A is expected to play the pure strategy eAl' the variance of his productivity is <p~(J~. 
Note that this measures the principal's prior uncertainty about A's value to the firm, and 
that for a given (J~, such uncertainty increases with power, simply because the failures and 
successes of powerful managers affect firm performance more than those of less powerful 
managers. Moreover, a Bayesian player updates his beliefs more quickly the higher the prior 
uncertainty. Hence, the rate at which the market and the firm will change their beliefs 
about a manager will be higher the higher this manager's power. Equivalently, dividing the 
production function (1) by <PA, 
where 
and the variance of the noise is 
I 1 
Yt = -Yt 
<PA 
E~ = 2-[<PB(1]B + eBt) + Et]. 
<PA 
(6) 
Hence, an increase in A's power is equivalent to an increase in the precision of his signal, Y~. 
The second part of the lemma is illustrated in Figure 1. The marginal effect of power 
(<PA) on accountability (aAl) is increasing for low values of power, and decreasing for high 
values. I leave an intuitive explanation of this result for the next section. 
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Figure 1: Updating coefficient for i (ail) as a function of manager i's power (<Pi) when O"A = (lB = 4 and 
(lE: = 1 
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3 OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF POWER 
3.1 COMMITMENT CASE 
As a first step, and in order to highlight the main relationships between managerial power 
and career concerns, I assume that the firm chooses how to allocate power among managers 
based on prior beliefs, and commits not to reallocate power after the priors have changed. 
In the next section I relax this assumption in order to analyze the relationship between 
promotions and career concerns. 
In the presence of a competitive labor market, the updating coefficients aAi and aBl are 
an essential determinant of managerial incentives, as they measure how market beliefs about 
managers depend on firm performance, and therefore whether a manager's effort can have a 
significant effect on his market value. In order to complete lemma 1 's caracterization of the 
relationship between power and accountability, the following result will be useful: 
Lemma 2 If managers are ex-ante identical ('T]Ao = 'T]BO = 'T]o, and O'~ = 0'1 = 0'2), then 
the value of CPi that maximizes aAi + aBl is a corner solution, cpi E {O, I}. The minimizing 
value is 1/2. Finally, aAi + aBl is increasing in 0'2 and decreasing in 0'; 
Proof: The lemma is proved by differentiation .• 
This result has a very intuitive explanation: suppose a priori the abilities of all managers 
are equally unknown, O'~ = 0'1 = 0'2. Re-arranging, the sum of the updating coefficients 
could be expressed as 
where O'}(CPA) - (cp~ + cp1)(J2. Here, (JJ(CPA) is just the prior variance of the team's produc-
tivity. Note also that when power is equally divided between the two managers, the firm 
minimizes the uncertainty about the team's productivity: O'J( cP A) is minimized at CPi = 1/2. 
Now suppose that the principal had hired only one manager, with prior ability CPA'T]AO + CPB'T]BO 
and prior variance (J]- (cp A)' After observing Yi, the updating coefficient that the principal 
would use to form his posterior beliefs about this imaginary manager would be precisely 
aAi + aBl, according to basic Bayesian updating.2 Thus the problem where the principal 
chooses how to allocate power between several managers is equivalent to a problem where he 
chooses the prior uncertainty about the ability of a single, imaginary manager. Finally, note 
2In the single-manager case, with Yt = 'T} + Ct, 'T} '" N('T}o, a2 ), and ct '" N(O, a;), the posterior ability is 
'T}1 = (1 - ad'T}o + a1Y1 and the updating rate is a1 = ,'7+2 2' 
u u. 
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that the rate of updating of a Bayesian principal is higher the higher the prior uncertainty 
about the manager. AB a consequence, it must be the case that the rate of updating for the 
imaginary manager, aAl + aBl, is maximized at the corners (<pi E {D, l}), since these values 
maximize the prior uncertainty about his ability. 
To analyze the profit-maximizing distribution of power, let Wit(TJit-l, eit) be the wage 
that the firm offers to manager i in period t given his expected ability (TJit-l) and effort 
(eit). Similarly, let W~(TJit-l) denote the wage offered to manager i by the market in period 
t. Labor market competition imposes the following constraints: 
W~(TJit-d = iTJit-l' (7) 
(8) 
for i E {A, B} and t E {1,2}. Because of labor market competition, managers can bid up 
their wages every time they are believed to have a higher ability, and this creates an incentive 
for them to work hard. Using the above constraints, it is also possible to obtain the following 
testable prediction of the model: 
Remark 1 Power and firm performance are complements in the wage function of each man-
ager: for i E {A, B}, 
This result is easily derived from (7) and (8) above: combining these two constraints, 
(9) 
and as a consequence 
which from lemma 1 is increasing in <Pi. Hence the model predicts managerial wages to be 
more sensitive to performance the higher the power of the manager. In equilibrium, the 
wages of powerful managers are more volatile than those of less powerful managers: the 
latter are not held very accountable by the labor market for the firm's performance, and 
as a result their wages are more insulated from productivity shocks. Finally, note also that 
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according to equation (9) above more powerful managers are paid higher wages in order to 
compensate for the fact that they exert more effort. But all managers receive the same payoff 
net of effort as long as their abilities are perceived to be the same. 
Having determined how the labor market rewards managers for firm performance, the 
equilibrium levels of managerial effort follow from the IC constraints 
(IC) 
which lead to c'(eil) = 6,C¥il and ei2 = o. Hence c'(e~ll) + c'(eln) = 6,(C¥Al + C¥Bl): the sum 
of the two managers' incentives depends on the rates of updating C¥Al and C¥Bl. In view of 
this expression the result of lemma 1 can be re-interpreted as follows: 
Remark 2 The sum of the two managers' incentives is maximized at the corners ('Pi = 1). 
Finally, the principal takes into account the IR constraints 
(IR1) 
(IR2) 
Defining F(.) = C'-l(.), a profit-maximizing principal chooses 'PA in order to maximize 
L ('Pi[7]iO(1 + 6") + F(6",C¥il)] - 2,7]iO(1 + 6") - c(F(6",C¥il))) 
iE{A,B} 
subject to 'PA + 'PB = 1, which gives the first order condition 
Proposition 1 Suppose the two managers are risk-neutral and ex-ante identical. An output-
maximizing firm chooses to give all the power to one of the managers: <P:4 = 1 or <PB = 1. 
Proof: Since managers are ex ante identical, they have the same prior ability, and the 
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distribution of power only affects output through effort. Letting 
the firm's output at <{JA = 1 (net of the ability terms) is F[6"(CtAl(1)). At any interior point 
(0 < <{JA < 1), on the other hand, output is 
where F[6"(CtAl(<{JA)] < F[6"(CtAl(1)) and F[6"(CtB1(<{JB)) < F[O"(CtAl(l)). Hence either <{JA = 1 
or <{J B = 1 maximizes output .• 
It is often argued that re-distributing power from very powerful managers to less powerful 
ones benefits the firm because the latter become more motivated and work harder.3 If a 
manager is already very powerful and motivated it would be intuitive to think that the firm 
would gain by transferring some of his power to a very demotivated, powerless manager, 
who would work harder as a result. This argument frequently appears in discussions on 
the benefits of employee participation plans, which many US firms have recently adopted.4 
Proposition 1 points out that this argument generally fails. First of all, its validity depends 
on the relationship between power and incentives: if the marginal return of effort for a 
manager is a concave function of power, then a re-distribution of power from the more to the 
less powerful manager will increase the latter's effort enough to compensate the reduction 
in the former's. However, we know from lemma 2 that the labor market's learning process 
generates a convex relationship between effort and incentives, and therefore the argument 
based on concavity does not hold. 
Secondly, power and effort are complements in the firm's revenue function, and this 
complementarity plays a crucial role. In fact, suppose power was equally distributed between 
A and B, and imagine that A, for some exogenous reason, decided to work harder. To take 
advantage of the increased effort, the firm would want to give him more power. But having 
more power, A would have more career concerns and would work even harder, making it 
3For example Lawler (1994) 
"The expected advantages of enriched jobs are many. Basically, the arguments in favor of 
this approach contend that enriched jobs produce greater motivation ( ... ) than simplified jobs. 
The increased motivation means that the employees will be more productive and will produce 
higher-quality work." (p. 193) 
4See Osterman (1994), Appelbaum and Batt (1994,1995), and Ichniowski et al. (1996,1997) for evidence 
on employee participation plans. 
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profitable for the firm to give him even more power. On the other hand, as A's power would 
be increased, B's would be reduced and B would exert less effort. But this would be a small 
loss for the firm, because the impact of B's effort on production would be smaller than that 
of A's. Hence it will overall benefit the firm to transfer power from B to A. Discussions on 
employee participation often overlook this complementarity, even though it comes directly 
from the standard notion of power as the ability to affect the decisions of an organization. 
Clearly, proposition 1 does not imply that a profit-maximizing firm will choose a com-
pletely unequal distribution of power. From the profit-maximization problem above, the 
expected wage bill is 
iE{A,B} iE{A,B} 
Given the convexity of the cost function c(.), labor costs are higher for the firm when power 
is distributed unequally. Thus, there are cost saving reasons for distributing power equally: 
it is not profitable to put too much power in the hands of a particular manager because he 
will tend to work very hard and will have to be compensated for it. It is more costly for the 
firm to induce additional effort from managers that are already working very hard (i. e. those 
at high positions) than from managers that have less power and are exerting less effort. 
Furthermore, when managers are risk-averse the above contract where power is concen-
trated in one manager is not optimal, because the manager with full power bears too much 
risk. In fact, before period-1 production takes place the variance of the second-period wage 
is 
which is increasing in 'Pi. This is so because managers at higher positions are made more 
accountable for the firm's performance, which is uncertain. As a consequence, a very risk-
averse manager who is given a lot of power has to be compensated with a very high risk 
premium, and the firm will prefer to reduce his power (even if this makes incentives worse) 
to provide him with some insurance: 
Proposition 2 Suppose managers are risk-averse (with utility functions represented by [3]) 
and ex-ante identical. Then the firm chooses a more equal distribution of power than in the 
risk-neutral case. 
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Proof. If manager i is sufficiently risk-averse, the constraint (IR1), rewritten as 
will bind if 'Pi is high .• 
Finally, it is also clear that a very unequal distribution of power will not be optimal when 
the managers' tasks are highly complementary. If the production function takes the form 
instead of (1), and ( > 0 is high, the firm will find it optimal to divide power equally, because 
the lack of incentives of the less powerful manager will cause too big a reduction in the other 
manager's productivity.5 
3.2 PROMOTIONS AND CAREER CONCERNS 
When firm performance provides information about managers' abilities, this information will 
be used to reallocate power efficiently, i. e. to give more power to the managers who appear 
to be more productive. In fact, if all managers are not equally accountable, the firm will hold 
very different posterior beliefs about managers who are a priori identical: the firm's failures 
and successes will make a priori similar managers look different simply because some of 
them will be blamed or credited more than others, according to their power. This generates 
a particular kind of tournament where the identity of the winner depends both on the initial 
allocation of power and on the team's first-period performance. This tournament differs from 
Lazear and Rosen's (1981) in that the firm cannot observe a signal of performance for each 
manager, and is forced to use an aggregate signal (team performance) to make inferences 
and decide upon the winner. In order to allow for promotions, I now use 'Pit (for i E {A, B} 
and t E {I, 2}) to denote manager i's position in period t. 
3.2.1 THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Lazear (1989) first pointed out that very competitive tournaments -tournaments with very 
high rewards- could give rise to sabotage, since by sabotaging his competitor an employee 
could improve his chances of winning the contest. He found that in such cases it would be 
5In this case, the learning process is the same as in the case we have studied before, because the effort 
levels are known in eqUilibrium and are substracted away (as in [5]). As a consequence, the le constraints 
are the same as before, but the firm has a stronger preference for dividing power equally. 
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optimal for the firm to reduce pay differences between winners and losers: the possibility of 
sabotage would lead to pay equality. However, competing managers often perform related 
tasks that the firm cannot measure separately: then it is only possible to assess the perfor-
mance of the team and use that signal to make inferences about individuals. In such cases 
there are no evident gains from sabotage: a saboteur may harm himself if team performance 
is low. Interestingly, the analysis below shows that even in this case some managers may 
have an incentive to sabotage. 
The principal's problem at the beginning of period 2 (after first period performance, 
Y1, has been observed) is very simple. Since managers exert no effort at period 2 (the last 
period), the optimal decision in period 2 is to give all the power to the manager who has 
the highest ability, thus choosing 'PA2 = 1 if TJA1 > TJB1, 'PB2 = 1 if TJA1 < TJ81, and any 
CPA2 E [0,1] if TJAl = TlB1. As a result when A and B make their effort choices in period 1, 
they take into account that their probabilities of being promoted are Prob{ TJA1 > TJ81} and 
Prob{ TJA1 < TJ81} respectively. After some manipulation, 
The coefficient of Zl in this expression determines whether a good performance in period 1 
(high zt} increases or reduces manager A's chances of being promoted. If 'PA1(j~ > 'P81(j~, 
an increase in period-1 performance increases A's probability of promotion. However, if 
'PA1(j~ < 'P81(j~, a better period-1 performance can only reduce A's chances of promotion. 
To understand why good performance might actually reduce A's chances, remember the 
updating formula (4), which gives 
( ) [ Zl 'PB1 ] TJA1 = 1 - aA1 TJAO + aA1 - - -TJBO . 
'PAl 'PAl 
Suppose A and B are ex-ante identical, and TJo = TJAO = TJBO. Ex post (after Y1 is observed), 
A's ability is a weighted average of TJo and a measure of firm performance, and so is B's. 
Suppose A had initially more power than B ('PAl > 'P 81). As a consequence, A is more 
accountable than B (aA1 > (81): the beliefs about A are more affected by firm performance 
than those about B. Therefore, if performance is better than the principal had expected 
(Zl > TJo), then A gets most of the credit for it, and TJA1 > TJB1. However, if performance is 
worse than expected, A gets most of the blame, and TJA1 < TJB1. Thus if A has more power 
than B in the first period, then B can only hope to be promoted if the team performs poorly 
in period 1: in that case, the principal will think that both A and B are less able than he 
thought, but his opinion about A will be relatively worse than that about B, because A had 
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been given more power ('PAl> 'PBl). 
This creates a conflict of interest between managers which may lead to sabotage: the 
more powerful prefer good outcomes (high performance), while the less powerful prefer bad 
outcomes, as they can only expect to receive more power when the firm performs poorly 
and some employees at higher positions are fired. In contrast with Lazear (1989), sabotage 
may arise even though managers are part of the same team, simply because one of them has 
more responsibilities than the other. Since the tournament is based on the relative beliefs 
about the contestants, a manager can benefit from harming his own teammate as long as he 
is blamed less than him when perforniance is found to be low. 
There is of course a possibility for the firm to use the initial allocation of power 'Pil to 
reduce the conflict of interest: 
Remark 3 If 'PAl = 'PA1, such that 
2 
ne aB 
'PAl = 2 + 2' 
a A aB 
there is no conflict of interest in period 1. 
Here, 'PA1 is the "no-conflict" allocation of power. From (10), when the initial power is 
allocated in this way the promotion decision is independent of period-1 performance, and 
the conflict of interest disappears. With this initial distribution of power, the principal 
commits not to change the employees' positions at period 2, and to achieve this, he gives 
more power to the manager that he knows better ex ante, i. e. to the manager with the 
lower prior variance. The reason for doing this is that a Bayesian principal updates more 
slowly his beliefs about the managers that he has better prior information of. As a result, 
these managers benefit less from the firm's good performance and are more likely to prefer 
bad performance. To compensate this, the principal can give them more power and in this 
way commit to update his beliefs at a higher rate. The better his prior information about a 
manager relative to the other, the more power he will have to give to the former. 
3.2.2 OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF POWER 
If inequalities create conflicts of interest between managers, the firm should perhaps dis-
tribute power equally in order to maximize profits. In fact, if managers are a priori identical, 
then a~ = a~, and 'PA~ = 1/2: an equal distribution of power fully eliminates the conflict 
of interest. In this section I prove that even in the presence of conflicts it is optimal to have 
some inequality. 
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First of all, note that if the firm were to pay each manager exactly his market value w~ 
(plus a compensation for the effort, according to (8)) and there was no cost for a manager to 
switch to another firm, then a manager's wage in period 2 would be independent of his power 
in that period, and would also be independent of whether he is fired or not: in any case, the 
manager would be certain to be paid the market wage wi2. Hence, under such assumptions 
the optimal allocation of power would be exactly the same as in the commitment case, even 
though power would be re-allocated in the second period. 
A more realistic and interesting case is the one where there is a wage premium attached 
to promotions, as in the tournament literature. In accordance with the fact that the labor 
market makes inferences about the two managers, I assume that the pay differential between 
the winner and the loser of the contest depends on the labor market beliefs. Specifically, 
suppose that when manager i is promoted ('Pi2 = 1), he obtains full bargaining power 
to determine his wage: in this way, the winner of the contest earns a wage premium, as 
in a standard tournament. The only difference is that the premium will depend on how 
different the contestants are perceived by the labor market to be. Thus, suppose that period 
1 performance has been such that TJAl > TJBl, and that the firm has accordingly chosen 
'PA2 = 1. Since the principal has no bargaining power, he has to pay 
WA2 = TJAl - (1 -,)TJBl. 
Manager A's wage cannot be greater than this because it would then be profitable for the 
principal to set 'PA2 = 0 instead of <{JA2 = 1, i.e. to fire A instead of B: manager B would 
be willing to work for the principal at WB2 = 'TNT/El and the principal's profits would then 
be (1 - ,)TJBl instead of TJAl - WA2. Therefore, before period-1 production has taken place 
manager A's expected period-2 utility is 
E(UA2 ) = P{TJAl < TJBl}EbTJAlITJAl < TJBl) + P{TJAl > TJBl}E[TJAl - (l-,)TJBlITJAl > TJBl] 
= ,E(TJAd + (1 -,)P{TJAl > TJBl}E(TJAl - TJBlITJAl > TJBl). 
(11) 
When manager A chooses his effort, he expects to earn his outside option and a promotion 
bonus. The size of the bonus will depend on the ability differential TJAl - TJBl, which in turn 
depends on the initial distribution of power and first-period performance. The higher this 
differential, the higher A's bargaining power, and the higher his wage. Thus managers take 
part in a tournament where the prize cannot be directly determined by the firm, but depends 
on the labor market's beliefs about the winner and the loser. Specifically, the winner's 
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prize depends on the market's perception about his ability, that the firm can influence by 
distributing power in one way or another. When the managers are a priori identical (with 
TJAO = TJBO = TJo and (J~ = (J~ = (J2), the expected ability differential is 
E( I ) - {(~ - ~:~)[E(Zllzl > TJo) - TJo] if !PAl> !PBl, TJAI - TJBI TJAI > TJBI -
(QAl - QBl )[E(Zllzl < TJo) - TJo] if !PAl < !PBI. 
'PAl 'PBI 
Note that from (5) for a given TJo the conditional expected value of performance, E(Zllzl > 
TJo), is an increasing function of managerial effort. As a consequence, if manager A is powerful 




the promotion premium is an increasing function of his effort. Hence when a powerful 
manager works harder he increases both his probability of promotion and the size of the 
premium. 
In equilibrium, each manager chooses period-1 effort to maximize the expected second-
period utility. Thus, A's first-period effort is characterized by the first-order condition 
where, using (11), 
8E(UA2 ) 8E(TJAl) 8P{TJAl > TJBl}(l )E( I ) 8 ='Y 8 + 8 - 'Y TJAI - TJBl TJAI > TJBI + 
eAI eAI eAI 
+ P{ > }(1- )8E(TJAl - TJBlITJAl > TJBl) TJAl TJBl 'Y 8 . 
eAl 
This is the marginal (undiscounted) return of A's first-period effort. The first term on the 
right-hand side is the marginal return that corresponds to the commitment case (section 3.1), 
and the other two terms measure the marginal effect of managerial effort on the promotion 
bonus. From our previous discussion, it is clear that the presence of a promotion bonus 
increases the incentives of the more powerful manager and reduces the other manager's. 
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Specifically, 
BE(UA2) 1 - , (aA1 a Bl ) -~-- = ,aA1 + --'PAl - - --
BeA1 2 'PAl 'PBl 
BE(UB2 ) 1-, (aA1 a B1 ) 
-."....:--..:... = ,aBl - --'PB1 -- - -- . 
BeBl 2 'PAl 'P B1 
In fact, if B has little power the promotion effect could even make his incentives negative,6 
and in that case B would try to "sabotage" the firm (i. e. he would exert negative effort) in 
order to increase his chances of promotion. 
Even though sabotage is harmful to the firm and could be avoided by simply setting 
'Pi1 = 'Piic , the following results show that costs of sabotage are outweighed by the benefits 
of distributing power unequally. 
Lemma 3 Suppose managers are ex-ante identical. Then 8E(UA2) + 8E(UB2) is maximized at 
8eAl 8eBl 
'Pi1 = 1 and minimized at 'Pi1 = 1/2. 
Proof. After some manipulation, the sum of the two managers' marginal returns to effort 
can be conveniently expressed as 
where aA1 + aBl, from lemma 2, is maximized at the corners .• 
Despite the similarity with lemma 2, this result is stronger because when power can be 
reallocated ex post the ex ante (period 1) misalignment of incentives becomes larger, and it 
is less evident that it should still be profitable to distribute power in an unequal way. But 
the result is intuitive: suppose the principal decides to make the initial distribution of power 
more unequal by giving more power to A. As a consequence B exerts less and less effort, 
because by doing so he increases his chances of promotion. However, B has also less and 
less power to affect the firm's output and, therefore, his probability of promotion. Hence, 
the reduction in his effort is relatively small compared to the increase in A's effort: as 'PAl 
6With ex-ante identical managers, further manipulation yields 
8E(UB2) = ~ aBl h - (!PAl - !pm)]. 
8eBl 2!PBl 
Therefore, B's incentives are negative if 'Y < !PAl - !PBl, i.e. if the principal faces little labor market 
competition. The reason for this is clear from (11): period-2 utility is a weighted average of the outside 
option and the promotion bonus. If labor market competition is very weak in period 2, the promotion bonus 
is relatively more important. 
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increases, A not only benefits more from any good period-l performance, but also has more 
power to affect performance. As a consequence he will increase his effort more than B will 
reduce his. 
Finally, a result similar to proposition 1 can be derived by simply replacing aAI and aBl 
with aAl and aBl, given by 
in the proof of proposition 1. 
Proposition 3 Suppose managers are risk-neutral and ex-ante identical. Suppose also that 
the allocation of power is changed after first-period performance (YI) is observed. Then an 
output-maximizing firm chooses to give all the power to one of the managers at the beginning 
of period 1,' <PAl = 1 or <piH = 1. 
Proof. The proof of proposition 1 can be reproduced because aAI and aBl are respectively 
increasing and decreasing in <PAl' • 
This result is also stronger than proposition 1, because in this case there is a conflict of 
interest between the powerful manager and the less powerful one where the latter chooses to 
sabotage, and despite the conflict the firm optimally chooses to have some inequality. 
3.2.3 REPLACING MANAGEMENT TO REDUCE CONFLICTS 
A natural way to eliminate the conflict of interest is to fire all managers when firm per-
formance is too low. In this way, none of the managers can hope to gain more power by 
sabotaging the team. Hence, suppose that after period 1 the firm can hire new managers 
who are exactly identical to the ones that had been hired at the beginning of the game: in 
particular, suppose the expected ability of outside managers is TJo. Assume that in period 1 
manager A has been given more power than B. If firm performance is high (Zl > TJo), the 
firm's optimal choice in period 2 is to promote manager A and fire manager B (<p A2 = 1), 
as in the case where no new managers could be hired. On the other hand, if performance is 
low it is now optimal to fire both managers and replace them with new ones (see figure 2). 
We therefore get the following result: 
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Proposition 4 Suppose the firm can hire new managers at the end of period 1. Then the 
equilibrium satisfies the following properties: 
• The period-1 allocation of power is unequal. 
• The less powerful manager is offered a one-period contract which is never renewed. The 
more powerful manager is offered a two-period contract contingent on firm performance. 
• There is no sabotage. 
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that 'PAl> 'PBl. First of all, it is clear that 
manager B will always be fired at the end of period 2: if Zl > TJo then TJBl < TJAl and it is 
optimal to give B's power to A. On the other hand, if Zl < TJo then TJBl < TJo and it will be 
optimal to fire both A and B and give all the power to a new manager. Hence B's second 
period expected utility is E(U B2) = iTJBl, and B will never sabotage. Consider now manager 
A. If Zl > TJo he will remain in the firm and will be promoted, whereas if Zl < TJo he will be 
fired and will be substituted by a new manager. Hence E(UA2) is still defined by equation 
(11) .• 
On one hand, the more powerful manager gets most of the credit when performance 
is high, and as a consequence the firm views him as more valuable than the less powerful 
one. On the other hand, in case of low performance outside managers appear as better 
replacements for the powerful manager than any insider, because they have had no part in 
the poor performance of the firm, while insiders have. Hence the less powerful manager never 
keeps his job for two periods: independently of how the firm performs in the first period, 
there is always a candidate (either the other manager or an outsider) that is thought to be 
more able than him. 
Of course, inside managers generally have some specific human capital that outsiders lack, 
and in this case there will be states of the world in which the less powerful manager will be 
able to keep his job. For instance, suppose that any new manager hired after period 2 has 
an expected ability TJb < TJo, i. e. such that if performance just meets the prior expectations 
(Zl = TJo), the firm gets a positive profit from not hiring any outsider. Then, as shown 
in figure 3, management will be restructured in three different ways depending on firm 
performance: if performance is very low, the whole team of managers will be replaced by 
a new team (outside succession); if performance is very high, the team of managers will 
remain but the managers who were already powerful will become more powerful; and for a 
range of intermediate values of performance the old team will remain, but power will shift 
from the more to the less powerful (inside succession). This is consistent with the evidence 
found by Parrino (1997) for the US. He classifies 977 CEO departures which took place 
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in 1969-1989 according to three criteria: forced versus voluntary successions, successions 
by insiders (lower-level managers from the same company) versus successions by outsiders, 
and successions by outsiders from the same industry versus successions by outsiders from 
another industry. He finds that the probability that a fired CEO is replaced by an outsider 
is more sensitive to firm performance, measured by industry-adjusted return on assets, than 
the probability that a fired CEO is replaced by an insider. Thus, when firm performance 
is not substantially below industry performance, fired CEO's are more likely to be replaced 
by insiders, and when firm performance is substantially lower than the industry average it 
is more likely that fired CEO's will be replaced by outsiders. Boards appoint insiders unless 
performance is very low. 
Note also that power will be reallocated differently in industries subject to different 
degrees of uncertainty: in industries where uncertainty is low, new managers will rarely be 
hired, but in highly risky industries firms will tend to replace old managers with new ones 
more often. 
4 POWER AND EXPLICIT MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES 
Ideally, pay-for-performance schemes would be most effective if the bonus of each manager 
could depend on individual measures of (his and possibly other managers') performance. 
But individual performance often cannot be measured, and firms have to rely on. aggregates. 
Since the precision of the information that aggregate measures provide about individual 
managers depends on the allocation of power among managers, it would not be optimal to 
offer identical pay-for-performance schemes to managers who do not have the same power. 
Suppose, following Gibbons and Murphy (1992), that managers are risk-averse with util-
ity functions given by (4), and assume that the firm offers a linear incentive contract 
at the beginning of each period t E {I, 2} for i E {A, E}. Because of the dynamics oflearning 
on one hand and the existence of a bonus bitYt on the other, managerial incentives have two 
sources: career concerns and the above pay-for-performance scheme. 
In period 2, managers have no career concerns and effort is determined by the explicit 
incentives only: 
'( ) 8WA2 '() c eA2 = -8-- {:> c eA2 = bA2'PA. 
eA2 
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According to this formula, a bonus scheme based on the company's performance is a better 
motivator for a powerful manager than for a less powerful one, because the effort of the 
former has less impact on firm performance and therefore on his wage. On the other hand, 
labor market competition imposes the following individual rationality constraint: 
where V(Y2iyd is the variance of second-period output conditional on first-period output. 
The firm chooses the incentive rates bA2 and bB2 in order to maximize expected profits 
subject to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, and the resulting 
optimal incentive rate is 
<P~ 
bA2 = <P~ + rc"(eA2)V(Y2!Yl)· (12) 
Hence an increase in A's power has two effects on the optimal second-period incentive rate. 
First of all, holding the posterior variance of output, V(Y2iyd, constant, it reduces the cost 
of motivating A: the more powerful A, the larger the impact of any additional unit of his 
effort on firm performance, and the larger the increase in his bonus. In this way, power 
increases the marginal return of A's effort. The second effect is on the posterior variance of 
output: after some manipulation, 
(13) 
which, by lemma 2, is minimized at IPA = <PB = 1/2. Hence the more equally power is 
divided, the lower V (Y2!Yl), and the cheaper it is to give incentives to A. As a consequence, 
when <P A < 1/2 the two effects reinforce each other, and the explicit incentive rate is an 
increasing function of power; and for IPA > 1/2 they compensate each other: giving more 
responsibility to A partly reduces the cost of incentives by increasing A's influence on the 
performance signal, but at the same time it increases the cost of incentives by increasing the 
variance of the signal. 
Proposition 5 For i E {A, B}, if e"' = 0 the incentive rate bi2 is increasing in <Pi. 
Proof: Let 0 < IPA < 1. Using (13) to substitute in (12), and dividing numerator and 
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denominator in (12) by rp~, 
1 
bA2 = ----..,.--------,-1 + rea; ( 0-2 0'2 + 1) 
0-
2 CP~ + --=:.:r 1+~ 
'i'A 
where c = c"(eit) .• 
With a quadratic cost function, the first effect dominates, and second-period incentives 
and power are complements: it is optimal for the firm to offer higher explicit incentives to 
more powerful managers, because such managers find it easier to influence firm performance, 
on which the incentive scheme is based. Modelling the firm as a hierarchy where efficiency 
wages are used to motivate employees, Williamson (1967) also found a complementarity 
between power and incentives at the optimum. Later on Calvo and Wellisz (1978) and Qian 
(1994) obtained a similar result. In these papers it is argued that if a top manager is well 
motivated he will monitor his subordinates more closely; and his subordinates will in turn 
work harder and will make their respective subordinates work harder. In this way, incentives 
spill over from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy, making it more profitable to motivate 
top managers than lower level managers. Proposition 5 points out that the argument based 
on the chain of monitoring is not essential to Williamson's (1967) original intuition that 
more powerful managers should be given more incentives: suppose several managers are 
not hierarchically related but have nonetheless different degrees of power -e.g. division 
managers in a large corporation. Then it will still be optimal for the firm to give higher 
explicit incentives to more powerful managers, even if these managers have less subordinates. 
In period 1, incentives are determined both by the pay-for-performance scheme and by 
the managers' career concerns: maximizing A's expected utility with respect to eAI, 
The first term on the right-hand side measures the effect of pay for performance on manager 
A's first-period effort, and the second term measures the effect of career concerns. Interest-
ingly, career concerns do not always increase effort: developing the second term on the right 
hand side, if 
(15) 
then career concerns reduce the manager's incentives. The reason for this reduction is that 
the firm's revision of the incentive scheme (salary and bonus) at the end of period 1 has a 
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ratchet effect on the level of compensation: consider manager A's choice of effort in the first 
period, characterized by the first order condition (14). By exerting more effort in period 
1, A tries to make the firm and the market believe that his ability is higher than it really 
is. Because of this high level of effort, period 1 performance, Yl, turns out to be high (on 
average), and the firm and the market tend to believe that the manager (and his colleague) 
is more able than it seemed a priori. This has two consequences. First of all, the manager's 
market value will increase and his second-period wage will be higher. This effect is captured 
by the term 'YaAl on the right hand side of expression (14), and is the standard effect of 
career concerns on incentives, as in Holmstrom (1982b). But there is also a second effect: 
if managers are thought to be more able, the firm will expect future performance to be 
higher too: E[Y2iyd > E[Y2]; and for any given rate bi2 future bonuses (bi2Y2) will also be 
expected to be larger. As a consequence, the firm will think that if the salaries ai2 are not 
reduced managers are going to be overpaid in period 2 in comparison to the market. In 
order to adjust their wages back to the minimum level (the market value) it will reduce 
the salaries. However, if this reduction is large it will create "negative" career concerns: 
anticipating that by trying to fool the firm they may actually cause a reduction in their 
salaries, managers will reconsider their intention to work so hard. This effect is measured 
by the term bA2'PA(aAl + aBl) on the right hand side of (14). The size of this perverse 
effect on incentives will depend on the size of the incentive rate bA2: if the firm is offering 
high-powered incentives, the change in the firm's beliefs that is caused by the increase in A's 
effort will have a large effect on the expected bonus (E[bA2Y2IYl]), and the firm will reduce 
the future salary aA2 by a large amount. 
Proposition 6 (Ratchet Effect) Assume that clll = O. For i E {A, B}, the ratchet effect 
(16) 
is decreasing in r and a;, and increasing in a2 and 'Pi. 
Proof: After some manipulation, 
where c = c"(eit). Using this result together with lemma 2, the comparative statics with 
respect to r, a; and a2 are straightforward. The comparative statics with respect to 'Pi can 
be derived from (16) after some manipulation which I sketch in the appendix .• 
By (13), an increase in either a2 or a; increases the posterior variance of output, V(Y2iYl), 
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therefore reducing the optimal period-2 incentive rate, bA2 . The reduction in bA2 causes the 
reduction in the ratchet effect. Similarly, an increase in the coefficient of absolute risk-
aversion r reduces the incentive rate and the ratchet effect. Finally, when 'Pi 2: 1/2 an 
increase in manager i's power increases his second-period bonus rate, bi2 , and the rate (aAl + 
aBl) at which the beliefs about team performance are updated, thus increasing the ratchet 
effect. 
Results for Gibbons and Murphy's (1992) one-manager model can be derived by setting 
'P A = 1 and 'Y = 1. It is then easily verified that career concerns never reduce managerial 
incentives: condition (15) is never satisfied. In that case, there are two reasons why career 
concerns unambiguously generate positive incentives. First of all, labor market competition 
is strong. As a consequence, if a manager works harder and causes performance to be higher 
(on average), his market vaI ue increases by a large amount. This partially compensates the 
ratchet effect: on one hand the firm would like to reduce his salary because the bonus is 
expected to be high, but on the other hand the manager's market value is higher, and the firm 
has to increase total compensation (salary plus bonus). Secondly, notice that a manager's 
market value depends only on the beliefs about his ability, whereas his bonus depends on 
the beliefs about the team's ability. Hence in general the rate at which the firm updates its 
estimate of the bonus (aAl + aBl) is higher than the rate at which the manager's market 
value is updated (aAl). This worsens the ratchet effect in the two-manager case compared 
with the one-manager case: with two managers, when a manager works harder, causing 
performance to be high, the bonus is likely to increase more than the manager's market 
value, and the firm will adjust his compensation down by reducing the salary. However, 
when there is only one manager the bonus and the market value are updated at the same 
rate, and this reduces the ratchet effect. Formally, substituting 'Y = 1 in (15), the right-hand 
side becomes 'PA'PB('PB - 'PA), which is negative if 1/2 < 'PA < 1 and is zero if 'PA --:- 1. 
Using the results for the optimal second-period contract, the optimal first-period incentive 
rate can be obtained by maximizing the firm's expected profits subject to the incentive 
compatibility and individual rationality constraints: 
For clarity it is useful to look at the case where the cost of effort is a quadratic function 
(c'" = 0). In that case, with c = c"(e) we can define 
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<p2 
b(<p, V) = 2 V' 
<P + re 
which is simply the bonus rate that the firm would offer to a manager with power <P when 
there are no career concerns and the variance of firm performance is V. We can then write 
fJ bAl =b(<pA, V(yt}) - -baAl - RA(<PA)]-
<PA 
- fJra2b( <PA, V(Y2!Yl))[b( <PA, V(yd) + b(l - <PA, V(Yl))]' 
The optimal linear incentive rate is equal to the rate that would be optimal if there were 
no career concerns, b( <P A, V (yd), minus two corrections. The first one is a career concerns 
correction: when the manager has positive career concerns, there is no need for the firm 
to offer him high-powered explicit incentives, because implicit dynamic incentives already 
guarantee that the manager is going to choose a high level of effort: the higher the manager's 
career concerns, the lower the need for the firm to give him formal incentives. The second 
one is an insurance correction which takes into account that, in period 1, managers are 
averse to period-2 uncertainty. When career concerns are not important (fJ is small), the 
last two terms are small and the distribution of power has only two effects on the design of 
the explicit incentive rate: first of all, it affects the variance of the firm's performance: the 
more equal the distribution of power, the lower the variance of the firm's performance, and 
the higher the optimal explicit incentive rate for every manager. Secondly, an increase in a 
manager's power increases the effect of his effort on firm performance, and therefore on his 
wage. As a consequence, it is profitable to increase that manager's incentive rate and reduce 
the other manager's. In some cases the latter effect dominates and it is optimal to give higher 
explicit incentives to more powerful managers. On the other hand, when career concerns 
are important, the interaction between power and explicit incentives is more complicated, 
because more powerful managers have more career concerns. In this case, the costs of giving 
explicit incentives to these managers might be low, but so will the benefits: if managers with 
more power have stronger career concerns, the benefits from inducing more effort from them 
(through an explicit incentive scheme) will be smaller. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
Consider a team of two top managers, and suppose that one of them is more powerful than 
the other -assume that the former can make important decisions, while the latter is left 
with relatively less important ones. One way to motivate the latter would be to give him 
more power, as suggested by some of the literature on motivation (e.g. Lawler, 1994). But 
this requires to transfer some of his colleague's power, who as a result will be less motivated. 
I analyze this trade-off and I show that even if managers are identical there is generally some 
degree of inequality at the optimum. I identify two reasons for this result. First of all, there 
exists a complementarity between power and managerial effort. More powerful managers not 
only tend to work harder: their effort is also more valuable to the firm, because it affects 
more important decisions. I argue that more powerful managers work harder because their 
decisions, being more important, are more visible to the outside labor market. Thus, more 
powerful managers have stronger career concerns. But if a manager is given more power 
and as a consequence starts to work harder, it will be profitable for the firm to increase 
his power even more so as to better benefit from his higher effort. Secondly, I show that 
the implicit incentives generated by the labor market via career concerns are convex with 
respect to power: as power is transferred from a powerful manager to a less powerful one, 
the incentives of the latter do not increase enough to compensate for the reduction in the 
former's. 
I also point out that when promotion decisions are based on internal tournaments an 
unequal distribution of power may create conflicts of interest between competing managers. 
Since more powerful managers are given more blame in case of poor performance, their 
less powerful competitors may have an incentive to sabotage in order to discredit them. I 
show that despite such conflicts some inequality is still optimal because potential saboteurs, 
having less power, will have a lower impact on the firm than the more powerful managers, 
who have strong incentives to work hard. I also show that outside successions (hiring top 
managers from other firms when performance is low) play an important role in this case as 
an instrument to limit internal conflicts of interest. This is consistent with recent evidence 
from US companies (Parrino, 1997). 
Finally, I analize how an optimal pay-for-performance scheme based on team performance 
should depend on each manager's power. I show that the use of explicit incentives can give 
rise to negative career concerns: if a manager works very hard and makes the firm believe that 
his ability is very high, the firm will revise its expectations of future performance upwards. 
As a consequence, it will reduce his salary because it will now expect future bonuses, which 
are based on performance, to be higher. But this will reduce the manager's career concerns. 
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The magnitude of the problem will depend on the degree of labor market competition and 
the level of explicit incentives: with strong competition and low-powered incentives, an 
increase in the manager's perceived ability produces a large increase in his market value and 
a relatively small increase in the perceived level of his future bonuses. Hence the problem 
will be small in this case. 
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A ApPENDIX 
A.l PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: 
I only sketch the proof of the relationship between power and the ratchet effect, which is the most tedious 
part of proposition 6. The other claims of the proposition require little manipulation. 
Without loss of generality, consider the ratchet effect for A, RA(ipA). We have 
R ( ) - IPA A IPA - 1 ( rcq2) rcq2· 
OA1+OBl 1 + cp~' + ~ 
After some manipulation, 
Sign{8~(ipA)} = sign{ip~[2ip~(I + 4p) - 2ipA(I + 2p) + 1 + p] + 
IPA 
+ rca;[8ip~(I + p) - 2ipA(3p - 4) + 3p + 4] + 2prca2[4ip~ - 8ip~ + 8ip~ - 4ipA + I]}, 
where p == a; / a2 • It is easily verified that the three polinomials in ip A which are shown in square brackets 
are strictly positive for IPA E [0,1]. 
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